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Abstract
We develop a mixed complementarity programming (MCP) based estimating
framework for non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to examine the evolution of market
access conditions in the textile and clothing sectors, working with a panel of
bilateral trade data on textile and clothing trade, underlying bilateral tar-
iffs, and the country-pair coverage of quotas under the WTO’s Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing (ATC). Our estimating framework takes advantage of
the panel nature of trade data when calculating export tax equivalents while
allowing for inequality constraints on the quota premium estimates. We also
introduce Gaussian quadrature for estimating goodness of fit for regression-
based NTB measures based on residual fitting.
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1 Introduction
Quotas on textiles and clothing trade have been a basic feature of the modern
trade landscape since the late 1950s. Given that these sectors are also the most
important export category for many developing countries, like Bangladesh,
these quotas have also been a painful thorn in the side of North-South trade
relations. The Ministerial Declaration at Punta Del Este that launched the
Uruguay Round stated that the ”Negotiations in the area of textiles and
clothing shall aim to formulate modalities that would permit the eventual in-
tegration of this sector into GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
on the basis of strengthened GATT rules and disciplines.” In plain English,
this was a promise to developing countries that quotas on textiles and clothing
were finally going to be eliminated. Indeed, this promise was critical to con-
vincing developing countries to sign on at the creation of the then new World
Trade Organization (WTO).
The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations launched at Punta Del Este led to
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) in 1995, the institutional shape
given to the promise to end quotas in an orderly process. The ATC featured
mechanisms for the gradual expansion of quotas and deliberate graduation
of whole product categories from the regime. The agreement was flagged as a
major showpiece in the Uruguay Round Agreements, and an important source
of trade-based income gains linked to the introduction of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). 1
Technically, the quotas were indeed phased out in a ten year process ending in
2005. However, it is now clear the quota graduation did not work as advertised.
Following a circus of ministerial panic and hurried negotiations in early 2005,
the EU and US subsequently began re-imposing quotas in late 2005, focusing
on adjustment costs related to China. The entire episode has raised impor-
tant questions about the real effectiveness of staged liberalization programs in
trade agreements that include administrative discretion, and about how much
liberalization really took place under the WTOs Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing (the ATC).
In this paper, we explore econometrically the evolution of market access con-
ditions under the ATC in the textile and clothing sectors. Working with a
panel of bilateral trade data on textile and clothing trade, underlying bilat-
eral tariffs, and the bilateral pairing of quotas, we develop a nonlinear mixed-
complimentarity based estimation framework for non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
that takes advantage of the panel-nature of the data when calculating tax
equivalents. We also introduce the use of Gaussian quadrature for estimating
1 See Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1995); Francois, McDonald, and Nordstrom
(1995); Hertel et al (1995).
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goodness of fit for regression-based NTB measures based on residual fitting.
In Section 2 we provide institutional background. In Section 3 we develop our
estimating framework, while we discuss our estimates in Section 4. We provide
closing comments in Section 5.
2 Background
Like agriculture, the textiles and clothing sectors emerged in the early years
of the GATT system as politically sensitive sectors. As such, they have been
treated as a special case within the world trading system, with their own
regulatory framework. While technically in violation of the GATT, the quo-
tas were first institutionalized in the beginning of the 1960s with the Short
Term Arrangements (STA) for international trade in cotton textiles. The STA
aimed at an orderly opening of restricted markets to avoid (for importing coun-
tries) ”detrimental market disruptions.” The definition of ”market disruption”
adopted by the Contracting Parties in 1960 entailed the possibility of singling
out imports of particular products from particular countries as the disrupt-
ing source. This opened the door for a series of bilaterally negotiated quota
restrictions that became the rule in the following Long Term Arrangement
(LTA) in 1962. The result has been a veritable alphabet soup of agreements
governing trade in the textiles and clothing sectors. Details on the subsequent
evolution of acronyms are provided in Table 1.
By the start of the 1970s, it had become apparent that the multiplicity of
makeshift arrangements protecting the textile and clothing industries had to
be replaced. Resulting negotiations led to the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA),
which went into effect in 1974. Over time, its product coverage was extended
from cotton to non-cotton textiles and clothing. The final MFA (known as
MFA IV) was extended several times, leading in the end to the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing in 1995.
Like the preceding arrangements, the MFA provided rules for the imposition
of quotas, either through bilateral agreements or unilateral actions, whenever
actual or perceived surges of imports caused market disruption (Baughman et
al 1997; Krishna and Tan, 1997). This included the threat of a surge. In the
years leading up to the Uruguay Round Agreements, six developed participants
actively applied quotas under the MFA - the EU, the U.S., Canada, Norway,
Finland and Austria. These were applied almost exclusively on imports from
developing countries. Sweden liberalized its textile and clothing regime in 1991
and actually managed to withdraw from the MFA. Sadly, it was forced to rejoin
this regime when it joined the European Union. Two other developed country
participants, Japan and Switzerland, did not impose MFA quotas, but instead
restricted themselves to ”signalling” a readiness to apply quotas by the act
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of being signatories to the MFA agreement, combined with (active) import
surveillance. As shown by Winters (1994), import surveillance can, at least in
concentrated industries, induce a fall in import levels as producers are trying
to forestall explicit quotas. The restrictiveness of the applied MFA quotas, and
subsequent ATC quotas, varied from product to product, and from supplier to
supplier. Norway dropped the use of binding quotas with the shift from MFA
to ATC.
By design, the ATC mapped a gradual phase-out of the quota restrictions
carried over from the MFA regime. The integration of the products covered
by the agreement was to be achieved in three stages under a ten-year transition
period. The first stage called for the integration of products comprising not
less than 16 percent of the total volume of each member’s 1990 imports of the
products listed in the annex to the Agreement. The second stage, beginning
in year 4, required the integration of a further 17 percent. The third stage,
beginning in year 8, required that another 18 percent of imports be brought
under normal GATT rules. Furthermore, each importing country was free to
choose the products it would integrate at each stage, the only constraint being
that they had to encompass products from each of the four groupings: tops and
yarn, fabrics, made-up textile products, and clothing. Products that remained
restricted during the transition period were to benefit from a progressively
increasing quota. The previously applied MFA quota annual growth rates were
to be scaled up by a factor of 16 percent in the first stage - for instance, from
3 percent to (3 x 1.16 =) 3.48 percent - an additional 25 percent in the second
stage, and yet another 27 percent in the third stage. This turned a 3 percent
initial annual growth rate to 5.52 percent in the third stage.
The stated intent of the ATC process was an orderly draw-down of restric-
tions, culminating in a smooth shift to quota-free trade in 2005. The reality
has instead been a mix of panic among trade ministries, hurried and frantic
negotiations, European trade embargoes on China, and the imposition of new
quotas by both the US and the EU. In the next sections we quantify the im-
pact of quotas under the ATC, and the evolution of their economic effects over
the full ATC implementation period.
3 Estimating Framework
3.1 Export Tax Equivalents
The impact of quantitative restrictions on trade is reflected in per-unit eco-
nomic rent generated by a binding quota. This is because a binding quota
effectively limits the supply of the good in the importing market, resulting in
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a price markup and giving economic rents to those suppliers who have access
to the market (i.e. who are able to export inside the quota). Since the quotas
on textiles and clothing were administered as ”voluntary” export restraints
by the suppliers, often with the quotas distributed by auction, these rents
can alternatively be seen as an implicit tax on exports. For these reasons, the
effect of the quotas in the literature is generally expressed as an export tax
equivalent or ETE.
One approach to estimating ETEs is based on comparisons of per unit auction
or license prices to export unit values (Martin 2001, Andriamananjara et al.
2004). This method potentially underestimates the full impact of the quota
since auction prices may be depressed if the importing agents have sufficient
market power. Another, econometrically-based approach involves estimating
the ETEs using residual based methods, either based on data for non-tariff
barriers (Leamer 1990, Harrigan 1993) or based on trade and tariff data with
the help of gravity-type models (Mayer 2003). We argue here that economet-
rically based estimates using the gravity model may themselves have a bias
related to price elasticities that imply overestimation of tariff equivalents. As
we follow this approach ourselves, we address this bias here.
In this section, we outline a set of techniques offering several improvements
over current methods. First, we correct for bias in price elasticity estimates
(a critical component in ETE calculations) by employing a 2-step estimation
procedure. We do this because we expect (an expectation supported by the
data) that trade elasticity estimates are biased downward when the sample
includes quota-constrained trade. Second, we base our estimates on joint es-
timation across a broad sample of importers and exporters. This differs from
the econometric literature in this area, which tends to focus on single im-
porters. (See for example Evans and Harrigan 2005.) Our approach allows
us to integrate the estimation process for the ETEs with the panel-based es-
timation of the underlying gravity model. Third, we also impose non-linear
constraints on the quotas, allowing for the mixed-complimentarity aspect of
the estimation problem. Finally, as we are working with estimates based on a
large non-linear econometric system, we introduce Gaussian quadrature as a
technique for assessing robustness of residual-based NTB estimates.
3.2 Data
To assess the evolution of textile and clothing quotas under the ATC, we work
with trade and tariff data from the UNCTAD’s COMTRADE and TRAINS
databases and the WTO’s database of applied tariffs. These data are available
through the UNCTAD/ World Bank WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution)
data system, and yield trade and applied tariff data spanning from 1996 to
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the present. For EU Members, we have had to combine common external tariff
data from the WTO with individual Member import data from COMTRADE.
Our trade and tariff data have been combined, in turn, with data on geographic
distance taken from CEPII’s recent compilation of various distance measures.
(See Clair et al 2004.) In total, this yields a database with 47,500 observations
on bilateral textile trade flows and 44,452 observations on bilateral clothing
trade flows, including 27,442 observations on OECD textile imports and 26,071
observations on OECD clothing imports. Annually, the data range between
roughly 2,200 and 7,000 bilateral flows per year and sector.
For the period covered by our sample, import quotas were maintained by the
United States, Canada, and the (then 15) Members of the European Union.
The U.S. import quotas (not all involving WTO Members) cover 46 exporters.
The European Union import quotas (again not all involving WTO Members)
cover 20 exporters. Canadian quotas covered 43 exporters at the launch of
the ATC. In our sample, 18,412 of our textile data points involve imports by
quota users, while 17,787 of our clothing datapoints involve imports by quota
users.
3.3 The Estimating Equation
We start by specifying CES import demand functions. 2 As we are working
with data that reflect actual trade flows and actual prices, and for which
therefore price indexes can be taken as given in each cross-section, this is
consistent with either the Armington approach to modeling trade flows or
Ethier/Krugman-type monopolistic competition based on CES demand for
varieties produced by firms. When we turn to our data, we treat each year
in our panel as representative of an equilibrium set of prices and transaction
quantities.
Formally, starting from CES preferences, if we take any importing country j,
demand for imports from source country i can be written as follows:
mi,j = Ej
(
pi,j
αi,j
)−σ
P σ−1j (1)
2 We can obtain a more general version of equation (1) in percent differences by
manipulation of a standard import demand function. The CES representation is
then a special case which we use as it maps directly to the standard representation
of import demand in national and firm-level product differentiation models, and in
the gravity model literature.
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where mi,j represents total imports by country j from country i, Ej is total
expenditure on the product category, pi,j is the internal price index for goods
imported from country i, αi,j is the country weight, Pj is the CES composite
price index, and σ is the absolute value of the Allen-elasticity of substitution.
We will later assume that the weights α are similar across OECD importers,
so that we can drop the second subscript.
We can in turn map world prices for goods, indexed across exporters i, to
internal prices, indexed by importer j, as follows:
Pi,j = Pi
∗ (1 + τi,j) (1 + ωi,j) γi,j (2)
In equation (2), Pi
∗ is the world price index for exports from country i, τi,j
is the bilateral tariff applied to imports from country i sold in country j, ωi,j
is the export tax equivalent of quantitative restraints, measuring the price
impact of non-tariff barriers, and γi,j measures transport costs following from
goods moving between i and j. Such costs may be a function of geographic
distance, for example, as is well established in the gravity equation literature.
(See for example Disidier and Head (2003) and Anderson and van Wijncoop
(2003).)
To move from equations (1) and (2) to estimating equations, we first substitute
equation (2) into equation (1), neglecting the quantitave constraints for a
moment, and then take logs. This yields equation (3).
logmi,j,t= logEj − σ logPi ∗ −σ log (1 + τi,j)
−σ log γi,j + σ logαi,j + (σ − 1) logPj (3)
We normalize the world fob price indexes to unity, such that imports net of
trade and distance barriers map to quantities. We also assume similar country
weights α in the cross-section, and specify transport costs γi,j as a function of
both geographic distance Di,j and a dummy for common borders Bi,j. Finally,
we control for both the domestic internal price index P and the set of import
CES weights by time-varying importer and exporter dummies X and M. In
this, we follow Matayas (1997) in including fixed importer and exporter effects,
though we depart from his specification in that we include time variations. 3
For our panel of observations indexed over time t we therefore have:
3 The us of country fixed effects in the recent literature on trade elasticities offers an
elegant solution to a problem plaguing the earlier literature, linked to the estimation
of unit values from trade value and quantity data. See ? and also Reinert and Shiells
(1993) for discussion.
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logmi,j,t=−σ log(1 + τ)i,j,t + βborderDi,j + βdistnce log δi,j
+βtimet+Xi,t +Mj,t + ei,j,t (4)
When we introduce quotas, we take advantage of the fact that in observed
trade data, expenditures will reflect the price impact of the quotas. This allows
us to estimate the manifestation of these price effects through the export-tax
equivalent of the quota. However, it is then important to recognize that a quota
is either binding, or not binding. This means that the export tax equivalents
of the quota ωi,j will be either positive or zero, but will not be negative. We
therefore impose inequality constraints on the ETEs of the quotas. Finally, as
we are working with a panel, and we know that the ATC involved a staged
process of quota expansion, we model the evolution of the ETEs over time
using a truncated fourth-degree polynomial (meaning that its applicability in
time t depends on whether or not the inequality constraint is binding.) 4
Putting all this together, we have:
logmi,j = −σ log(1 + τ)i,j,t + βborderDi,j + βdistnce log δi,j
+βtimet+Xi,t +Mj,t
−σ log(1 + ωi,j,t) + ei,j,t (5)
log(1 + ωi,j,t) = max
 ai,j + a1i,jt+ a2i,jt2 + a3i,jt3 + a4i,jt40 (6)
The inequality constraint on the matrix of export tax equivalents is reflected
in equation (6). Combined with the equality of the tariff and quota price
elasticity σ in equation (5), this puts us in the realm of non-linear estimation
when we focus on the estimation of the quota price wedges ω.
4 While not reported here, we have also estimated three different sets of quota
price effects mapped to ATC stages 1, 2 and 3 as indicated in Table 1. The fit of the
regression is better when allowing for a more flexible, non-linear time trend over
the whole period, though the results of both sets of estimation are qualitatively
quite similar. Since many factors influencing the cost effects of the quotas (like for
instance supplier capacity, tariffs, regional agreements, etc.) change annually and
not with the different stages of the ATC, it seems to be reasonable to allow for
greater flexibility in the estimation. Higher degree polynomials do not yield any
real difference in the fit of the model to the trade data, based on a comparison of
the resulting ETEs.
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3.4 Two-Step Estimation and Gaussian Quadrature
As shown in Section 4 below, trade elasticity estimates with a full sample
(inclusive of quota-using importers) appear to be biased downward by the
effect of quotas on trade for ATC importers. We therefore first estimate trade
elasticities for a restricted sample (exclusive of ATC importers) using equation
(4), and then impose the resulting estimates of coefficient means and standard
deviations on the unrestricted (inclusive of quotas) sample using equations (6)
and (5) to estimate the underlying ETEs for the full sample. This means that
the first and second moments of our quota wedge estimates from the second
stage estimation, being based on full-sample residuals, are a function of the
corresponding moments for the trade elasticities that were estimated in the
first stage.
We are interested not only in the ETEs themselves from equation (6), but
also the robustness of the estimates with respect to underlying uncertainty
in our estimates of key parameters in equation (5). One obvious solution is
Monte Carlo simulations at the second stage. However, we are working with
a system of over one hundred equations estimated over up to 47 thousand
observations. In addition, as noted by Haber (1970), Monte Carlo simulations
do not necessarily assure reasonable accuracy. As an alternative to Monte
Carlo simulations, we instead use order three Gaussian quadrature to estimate
the variance of our ETE estimates given that they are based on our estimates
of the elasticities in equation (5). Recent research suggests that quadrature
methods are preferable in several ways to Monte Carlo methods, in many
cases being both less computationally demanding and at the same time more
accurate (Schu¨rer 2003).
Gaussian quadrature builds on treating numerical problems with stochastic
exogenous variables (in this case our second-stage least-squares estimation
building on uncertain coefficient estimates from the first stage least squares
estimation) as numerical integration problems. This approach has now be-
come relatively standard for assessing uncertainty in numerical solutions with
respect to parameter uncertainty in large scale general equilibrium models.
(See Arndt 1996, Plumb 2001, and Hertel et al 2004). However, as far as we
are aware, it has not been applied in the context of NTB estimation based on
gravity models of trade. We follow Arndt’s characterization of Stroud (1957)
solution for a third order approximation for the distribution of a set of random
variables v specified as function of stochastic variables x. Essentially, Stroud’s
solution defines a set of systematic draws in x space sufficient to obtain esti-
mates of the mean and variance of our variables v. Formally, for n stochastic
variables, we need only k = 2n draws. Each draw starts by taking g = n/2
pairs (taken to the greatest integer not exceeding n/2) of systematic draws of
stochastic variables γ with mean zero and standard deviation one, denoted by
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γg,k. This yields a matrix Γ of coefficient pairs γg, with number of rows equal
to the number of stochastic variables x (equation 7) and each column defining
one quadrature in our parameter space (equation 8). In particular, denoting
the vectors of the mean and standard deviation of variables x by µ and σ
and assuming that σ is diagonal, the desired quadrature (the set of systematic
draws on x) is obtained as defined in equation (8).
γg =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
√
2 cos
(
(2g−1)kpi
n
)
(k = 1, 2, ...., 2n) (g = 1, 2, ...[n/2])√
2 sin
(
(2g−1)kpi
n
) (7)
Φ = µ+ Γσ (8)
Once we have the matrix of systematic draws on x, represented in equation
(8) by Φ, we then need to take this set Φ and solve the second-stage least
squares estimation problem 2n times, one with each set of draws on x in Φ.
The resulting set of estimates for v can then be used to directly estimate the
mean and variance for v.
4 Estimated ETEs: The Evolution of Quota Rents
Tables 2 and 3 report OLS estimates for equation (4). The first column in both
tables shows OLS results for the full sample, while the subsequent columns
show OLS results for the sub-samples of non-OECD countries, OECD coun-
tries, and OECD countries excluding quota users. As quantity constraints,
by definition, limit price-sensitivity, we should expect this to bias downward
any estimate of price sensitivity, corresponding to the tariff elasticity in the
Tables. Indeed, the pattern is one of significantly different, and higher, tar-
iff elasticities when we exclude the countries that utilize quotas. In addition,
the non-OECD countries exhibit a somewhat higher (though not significantly
different) degree of price sensitivity than the non-quota OECD sample.
Because estimated price elasticities are otherwise biased downward, in esti-
mating quota price effects through the system of equations (5) and (6) we
start by imposing the estimated elasticities for the quota-free sub-sample.
The estimation problem is then specified as a minimization problem with
mixed-complimentarity constraints, where we impose the system of equations
(6) and solve for the set of non-negative quota coefficients and importer and
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exporter dummies that minimize the sum of squared errors. 5 The resulting
estimated non-linear time trend of quota price effects gives us a broad sense
of the evolution of the quota wedges over the stages of the ATC phase-out
period. Gaussian quadrature is employed, based on the first and second mo-
ments of coefficients reported in column 4 of Tables 2 and 3 (with the CBERA
coefficient estimates taken from column 3) to obtain the standard errors used
to calculate t-ratios reported in the detailed annex tables. The full set of es-
timates by importer and exporter is reported in Annex Tables A-1 to A-6.
Summary results are reported in Table 4. The general pattern is one of sig-
nificant estimates. Figure 1 shows the evolution of two of the most significant
sets of ETEs (China and India) over time.
Table 4 reports information on the top five suppliers in textiles and clothing
for the quota using importers, Canada, the USA, and the EU. Since China
ranged among the top suppliers for all quota users in 2001, the evolution of
the Chinese export tax equivalents as implied by the quotas can be read from
the table. Canada is the quota user most compliant with the ATC among
all three. The reduction in price wedges for China are especially impressive.
Between 1996 and 2003 the export tax equivalent was reduced to zero from an
estimated 6.3 per cent in textiles and as much as 43.7 per cent in clothing. Also
against other suppliers, liberalization was substantial in Canada, even if some
high barriers remained, mostly against minor suppliers (for instance Jamaica,
Qatar, and Morocco). Further, as reported in Francois and Spinanger (2004),
Canada - like the US - maintained a pattern of strong protection against
suppliers of wool products. This results in high constraints among others for
Eastern European suppliers on the North American market.
Turning to the US, export tax equivalents for China have gone up. Figure 1
shows that this has not been a linear trend, some reduction in ETEs took place
until the end of the second stage of the ATC. Especially notable is the spike at
the end of the ATC. It seems reasonable to blame this spike for contributing to
the political problems caused by a surge in imports from China in early 2005.
These ended with reimposition of quotas in later 2005. The spike in U.S. quotas
follows from the interaction of several factors. The first factor is the failure
of quota growth to keep up with growth in potential trade. This is illustrated
in Table 5. The table quantifies the strong expansion of the Chinese economy
and thus the huge increase in export potential over the life of the ATC. This
growth well surpassed quota growth rates. While the Chinese quotas on the
US market increased by 33 percent in textiles and 41 per cent in clothing
between 1994 and 2004 (See Table 5), Chinese GDP rose by 170 per cent over
the same period. With a cumulative growth of 61 per cent, already the US
5 Our OLS results in Tables 2 and 3 were estimated in STATA, while the constrained
least squares estimates of the quota premiums, including the application of Gaussian
quadrature, were estimated with GAMS.
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GDP growth - as a proxy for the growth of import demand - surpassed the
rate of quota expansion. Another factor was the ability to ”borrow forward”
on quotas. This meant that, for example, in late 2000 importers could borrow
against 2001 quota limits. Obviously, by late 2004, there were no more quotas
to borrow against, contributing to the late spike in US ETEs as the system,
by construction, became increasingly restrictive.
Note that in 2001-2002, Vietnam graduated from Smoot-Hawley to MFN tar-
iffs. Vietnam’s trade is mapped to MFN tariffs in the WITS database, so that
the estimates for the initial years in the Table (broadly mapping to ATC Stages
1 and 2) reflect Smoot-Hawley tariffs. The move to MFN rates is reflected in
the dramatic drop in Vietnam’s ETEs when moving into ATC Stage 3. Also
note that, like Canada, the U.S. also had substantial protection against East
European suppliers. This corresponded to a narrow set of wool-based products
that were restricted by U.S. quotas. These quotas were not really an issue at
the end of the Uruguay Round. In 1993, these countries were emerging from
the fog of communism, and were not major players on world markets. De-
tailed examination of the quota and trade categories involved shows that the
North American regimes are protecting domestic producers of wool fabrics,
suits, and related items. This protection is quite high. Finally, several coun-
tries have been largely graduated toward a liberal trade regime. This includes
many of the lower income Asian and African suppliers, as reflected by their
absence from the Tables.
Overall, despite the surge in ETEs for the US shown in Figure 1, the observed
backloading of trade liberalization vis-a`-vis China should not be surprising and
cannot be ascribed purely to non-compliance with the ATC. It was instead a
consequence, in part, of the system. At the same time though, our results do
suggest that the US in general did not implement the ATC according to plan.
Between 1996 and 2004, protection against restricted suppliers went up for 15
exporters of textiles - with increases in tariff equivalents greater than ten per
cent for Indonesia, China, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Uruguay, and
Slovakia. Only four suppliers - Cambodia, Macedonia, Brazil, and Pakistan -
faced decreasing export tax equivalents during the ATC. For clothing, three
suppliers - Uruguay, Cambodia, and India - saw a fall in their ETEs, while nine
suppliers faced increasing price distortions - Turkey, Bulgaria, China, Poland,
Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Czech Republic. The latter three faced increases
of more than 100 per cent in ETEs. Finally, several countries with quotas had
already moved towards a liberal trade regime, including many of the lower
income Asian and African suppliers. This can be concluded from the absence
of binding quotas under the ATC.
While there is a clear pattern towards liberalization for imports to the Euro-
pean Union, the degree of liberalization was more limited than in the Canadian
case. Although trade with China grew more open, the degree of protection re-
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mained high at the end of the ATC. 6 Figure 1 and Table 4 both show the fall in
protection against China. However the tariff equivalents at the end of the ATC
remained substantial. The removal of the quota system by 2005 thus implied
a substantial surge in imports from China. Indeed, preliminary 2004 and 2005
figures showed tremendous increases in China’s market share in the EU mar-
ket, leading to a re-imposition of quotas by the middle of 2005. We estimate
that textile and clothing imports from India were no longer restricted by the
quotas in 2003. As such, the removal was not expected to show strong direct
effects. Similar to the US market, imports from Vietnam were also restricted
on the EU market at the end of the ATC. The estimated tariff equivalents
were comparable to those for China. Thus, while the EU has moved towards
more liberalization in textiles and clothing, protection remained high against
China and Vietnam when the final stage of full liberalization in the ATC was
reached. Thus, substantial restructuring among suppliers on the European
textile and apparel market starting in 2005 should not be surprising.
The results reported in Table 4 and the annex tables are broadly in line with
other, auction-based estimates in the literature. There are of course some dif-
ferences between various estimates of protection due to differences in methods,
quota price information, and aggregation problems. For example, the estimates
by Martin (2004) and by Andriamananjara et al (2004) are both based on dif-
ferent sets of auction prices, while our estimates are based on a gravity-type
trade model. In general, our estimates and both of theirs all report higher
protection rates in the clothing industry than in textiles. This is reasonable,
since textiles are one of the major inputs in clothing, thus blocking textile
imports would hurt the domestic clothing industry, whose protection stands
behind the quota system, in the importing countries. The results for protection
against China are broadly in line between the three different studies. Protec-
tion against imports from China remained high until the very end of the quota
system in 2005. As auction prices reflect the rents accruing to exporters, auc-
tion estimates also tend to be systematically lower than our estimates. This
makes sense, as our estimates also capture rents accruing to importers.
5 Summary and Discussion
One of the lynchpins of the Uruguay Round Agreements was a plan to (finally)
eliminate quotas on textiles and clothing. This plan, known as the Agreement
6 Due to the reporting procedures for the EU to UNCTAD, we do not have full
EU import data for 2004. (Neither do we have full Canadian data). Given that the
ATC was implemented in stages with 2003 and 2004 both in the third stage, and
that the EU and Canadian systems did not have borrow-forward provisions, we use
2003 estimates as upper bounds for 2004 in the discussion and in Figure 1.
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on Textiles and Clothing (the ATC), embodied commitments to a ten year,
staged reduction in quotas. The process was meant to be orderly, systematic,
and transparent. Yet the end of the ATC has seen surges in imports from
China, panicked trade ministers, rushed meetings, and the reimposition of
quotas on China by late 2005. In this paper, we have examined the evolution
of textile and clothing quota rents under the ATC. A key message from the
econometrics is that the problem of China’s (PRC) textile and clothing sector
integration was basically deferred rather than managed in stages. This was not
solely a result of the ATC itself, but was certainly reinforced by insufficient
pre-defined quota expansion rates during a period of outstandingly strong
expansion of China’s supply potential.
The patterns of protection explored in this paper have serious implications
for the pattern of textile and clothing trade. Non-ATC suppliers, including
U.S. FTA partner Mexico, EU customs union partner Turkey and the ben-
eficiaries of EU trade preferences in Africa, can expect a dramatic erosion
of competitive position. Recent quotas on China will slow this process, but
most likely will not stop it. In the case of the United States, this implies a
substantial shift of import demand for clothing toward China, Turkey, and
India. In addition, sourcing of wool products can be expected to shift further
out of North America. In the European Union, we should expect a large, but
less so, shift of demand toward China as well. This is because the quota pre-
mium for China is less than the China premium for the United States. This
will be accompanied by a further shift toward East Asian supplies, as the EU
has higher East Asian premiums than the U.S. This means, of course, that in
third markets, non-APC suppliers should pick up market share. This includes
export markets like Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, in addition to the
middle-income exporters.
In addition to backloading of liberalization, an additional area of concern
related to the implementation of the ATC and associated Uruguay Round
MFN-tariff reductions has been the scope for preference erosion, especially
for the least developed African countries. Virtually all African countries have
entered into contractual preference arrangements with the European Union,
and obtain preferential treatment for certain exports in the United States and
Japan, as well as in other developed country markets under GSP schemes.
There has consequently been a concern that implementation of the market
access results of the Uruguay Round would diminish rather than augment their
trade and economic prospects. The scope for relative preference erosion under
the ATC is different from that related to tariff preferences. (See Francois,
Hoekman, and Manchin 2006). It follows instead from the fact that at the
start of the ATC phase-out, some countries and regions faced much greater
restrictions than others. The lower-income suppliers in India and elsewhere in
South Asia, in particular, faced negative preferences, in the sense that they
faced greater effective restrictions than suppliers from East Asia and elsewhere.
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The distributional effect of the MFA restrictions was thus to discriminate
between developing countries, and against suppliers like India and Pakistan.
Even where some developing countries were favoured by preferential access,
this has been largely at the expense of other developing countries. The MFA
and ATC have, in effect, been serving as a negative preference system, helping
some developing country suppliers at the expense of others.
Rounding out the prospects for future trade and protection is the scope for
contingent action against China. Specific contingent protection rules were in-
cluded in China’s protocol of WTO accession. These permit other WTO mem-
bers to keep protectionist pressure up against China for 15 years. They cover
special anti-surge clauses for textile and clothing products (4 years), general
anti-surge clauses (12 years) and treatment of China as a ”non-market econ-
omy” in antidumping cases (15 years). The ability of the US and the EU to
press China on new quota limits should be viewed in the context of these
contingent protection options.
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Table 1
A Parade of Acronyms: the evolution of quotas
year overview of events
1955-57 U.S.-Japan dispute leads to a 5 year agreement limiting
textile exports
1958 United Kingdom imposes ”voluntary” limitation on cotton
T&C products with Hong Kong, by threatening to otherwise
impose quotas at levels lower than prevailing volumes.
1959 United Kingdom signs restraint agreements with India and
Pakistan.
1960 GATT Contracting Parties recognize the problem of ”market
disruption” to serve as an ”excuse” for establishing future NTBs.
1961 STA: The Short Term Arrangement (STA) is agreed.
1962 LTA1: The Long Term Arrangement (LTA) is agreed, to
commence October 1, 1962, and last for five years.
1963-65 U.S. tries and fails to establish agreement on trade in wool products
1966 The United Kingdom implements a global quota scheme in violation
of the LTA. The LTA provides only for product-specific restraints.
1967 LTA2:Agreement is reached to extend the LTA for three years.
1969-71 United States negotiates VERs with Asian suppliers on wool and
man-made fibers.
1970 LTA3:Agreement is reached to extend the LTA for three years.
It was later extended three months more, to fill the gap until the
MFA came into effect.
1973 MFA I:The MFA is agreed, to commence January 1, 1974,
and to last for four years.
1977 The European Economic Community and the United States
negotiates bilateral agreements with developing countries
prior to agreeing to extension of the MFA.
1977 MFA II:The MFA is extended for four years.
1981 MFA III:The MFA is renewed for five years. The USA, under
pressure from increased imports resulting from dollar appreciation,
negotiates tough quotas.
1986 MFA IV:The MFA is extended for 5 years, to conclude with the
expected end of the Uruguay Round.
1991 MFA IV+:The MFA is extended pending outcome of the
Uruguay Round negotiations.
1993 The Uruguay Round (UR) draft final act provides for a 10-year
phase-out of all MFA and other quotas on textiles in ATC. MFA
extends until UR comes into force. ATC allows credit for
liberalization in products that are not actually restricted.
1995 ATC1:1st ATC tranche liberalized 16% of 1990 imports.
1998 ATC2:2nd ATC tranche liberalized 17% of 1990 imports.
2001 ATC3:3rd ATC tranche liberalized 18% of 1990 imports.
2005 ATC4:4th ATC tranche liberalized 49% of 1990 imports.
De´ja` vu all over again: U.S. and EU re-impose quotas on China.
Source: Based on an update of Francois, Glismann, and Spinanger (2000).
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Table 2
Textile Regressions
Non-OECD All OECD Non-quota
coefficient All countries importers importers OECD
ln(1 + t) -5.43*** -7.60*** -3.11*** -6.57***
(-23.57) (-24.64) (-8.54) (-13.24)
distance -1.36*** -1.50*** -1.06*** -1.13***
(-82.95) (-65.82) (-40.23) (-28.81)
border 0.79*** 1.39*** 0.37*** 0.29**
(11.92) (13.81) (4.50) (1.97)
EEA 0.26*** 0.81*** 0.02 0.51***
(4.86) (13.81) (0.27) (4.53)
NAFTA 0.08 . 1.55*** 1.47***
(0.26) (5.50) (2.94)
CBERA 0.96*** . 1.85*** .
(6.82) (13.96)
adj. R-sq: 0.735 0.694 0.812 0.811
obs: 46,672 19,235 27,437 9,030
df: 44,179 17,161 25,235 7,237
F: 52.92 22.07 49.34 22.60
Pr>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
*** (**) denotes>.01 (.05) level of significance; t-ratios in parentheses.
19
Table 3
Clothing Regressions
Non-OECD All OECD Non-quota
coefficient All countries importers importers OECD
ln(1 + t) -0.08 -2.26*** 0.02 -2.09***
(-0.28) (-4.65) (0.04) (-3.98)
distance -1.39*** -1.42*** -1.08*** -1.24***
(-81.59) (-58.07) (-40.44) (-32.38)
border 0.83*** 1.35*** 0.51*** 0.56***
(12.25) (12.72) (5.98) (3.62)
EEA 0.36*** 0.72*** 0.42*** 0.10
(6.37) (7.35) (5.55) (-0.92)
NAFTA 0.31 . 1.34*** 1.35***
(1-02) (4.71) (2.78)
CBERA 0.14*** . 2.09*** .
(9.23) (15.57)
adj. R-sq: 0.745 0.672 0.800 0.797
obs: 43,273 17,202 26,071 8,284
df: 40,811 15,251 23,884 6,578
F: 52.25 15.83 48.47 20.10
Pr>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
*** denotes>.01 level of significance; t-ratios in parentheses.
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Table 4
Top 5 Import Suppliers
2001
import 2001 ETEs
share tariff 1996 2003
EU15 : textiles
Turkey 14.0 0.0
China 9.1 8.2 22.8∗∗∗ 13.4∗∗∗
India 8.1 7.5 7.1∗∗∗
United States 4.7 6.4
Pakistan 4.6 0.0 15.1∗∗∗ 0.01
ALL 100.0 1.8 1.8 0.7
EU15 : clothing
China 17.1 10.6 94.2∗∗∗ 24.1∗∗∗
Turkey 8.5 0.0
Romania 6.6 0.0
Tunisia 6.2 0.0
India 5.8 8.5 23.9∗∗∗
ALL 100.0 3.2 15.1 3.7
USA : textiles
Mexico 12.7 0.1
European Union 10.9 8.5
China 10.2 7.4 6.9∗∗∗ 25.3∗∗∗
Canada 7.7 0.0
Pakistan 5.4 9.0 5.5∗∗∗ 2.9∗∗∗
ALL 100.0 7.9 4.0 3.6
USA : clothing
China 13.3 9.8 76.4∗∗∗ 112.8∗∗∗
Mexico 12.1 0.1
Hong Kong 6.9 11.5
European Union 4.5 10.1
Indonesia 4.3 12.7
ALL 100.0 9.9 11.4 16.9
Canada : textiles
United States 54.2 0.0
European Union 8.7 9.4
China 7.4 13.5 6.3∗∗∗
Korea 4.4 10.3
India 3.6 10.9 0.0
ALL 100.0 5.2 0.5 0.0
Canada : clothing
China 27.4 15.6 43.7∗∗∗
United States 12.0 0.0
European Union 8.0 16.3
India 7.8 17.7
Hong Kong 6.4 17.9
ALL 100.0 14.5 13.1 0.1
*** denotes estimated ETEs significant at the .01 level.
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Table 5
Cumulative Growth in percent: 1994-2004
quota growth GDP growth
textiles clothing
US EU US EU per-capita in total
importer
United States 49 66
European Union 55 61
exporter
Bangladesh 168 . 168 . 26 53
China 33 50 41 38 151 171
Hong Kong 37 16 17 22 1 16
India 141 50 116 79 57 84
Indonesia 134 83 133 117 19 35
South Korea 37 70 12 38 34 44
Pakistan 139 79 150 119 30 63
Sri Lanka 134 204 132 204 43 56
Philippines 134 112 119 112 1 21
Thailand 127 116 123 116 -10 -1
Source: Martin (2004), Eurostat, IFS, and own calculations.
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Table A-1
Canada: non-linear least squares estimates of ETEs for textiles
supplier 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Arab. Emirates 29.5 15.7 9.5 5.8 2.6 6.8
(10.53) (11.92) (11.04) (9.53) (8.59) (7.35)
Bangladesh 2.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1
(3.95) (3.96) (2.87) (1.76) (0.53)
Bulgaria 0.5 1.4 2.3 2.3
(1.6) (1.6) (1.6) (1.6)
China 6.3 1.9 0.3 0.1 0.1
(7.71) (6.07) (2.89) (2.56) (3.9)
Costa Rica 2.5 2.6 0.8 1.6 6.6 13.9 17.7 8.0
(1.35) (2.16) (0.66) (1.14) (3.54) (5.88) (6.79) (3.94)
Dom. Rep. 0.3 0.1 0.03 0.01
(0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44)
Hungary 6.7 0.7 0.0 1.0 1.7 1.3 0.1
(3.84) (2.72) (1.29) (1.45) (1.47) (0.56)
India 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
Jamaica 23.0 8.3 15.4 30.1 42.6 47.2 45.7 48.3
(7.6) (3.65) (5.66) (7.65) (8.31) (8.5) (8.45) (8.22)
Cambodia 28.8 16.8 15.9 16.4 13.4 6.7
(10.05) (11.24) (10.24) (9.31) (8.96) (8.99)
Lao PDR 21.4 1.1 0.1 4.8 7.9 6.7 3.6 6.1
(10.31) (2.9) (0.58) (8.95) (8.52) (6.85) (6.42) (10.41)
Lebanon 52.8 10.6 2.0 2.0
(11.66) (13.62) (14.17) (14.17)
Sri Lanka 2.7 1.0 0.2 0.02
(2.92) (2.94) (2.95) (2.95)
Lesotho 60.9 19.5 4.7 0.4 0.3
(10.6) (9.18) (6.06) (1.73) (9.65)
Morocco 7.4 1.3 2.6 7.1 12.0 15.3 16.6 16.8
(7.69) (2.9) (5.42) (9.13) (10.39) (10.81) (10.61) (9.41)
Malaysia 7.5 2.6 0.6 0.1
(6.28) (6.43) (6.49) (6.51)
Oman 30.8 6.6 1.3 1.3
(8.15) (9.01) (9.24) (9.24)
Pakistan 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.01
(1.7) (1.7) (1.71) (1.7)
Korea, PR 206.3 114.8 123.4 86.7 112.7
(7.78) (8.59) (8.32) (9.6) (8.95)
Quatar 4.9 36.4 131.5 197.0 139.8 47.3 20.0
(4.77) (12.18) (8.68) (7.49) (8.08) (10.53) (15.7)
Romania 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.5 2.5
(0.96) (1.19) (1.58) (2.34) (3.74)
Russia 2.2 1.0 0.3 0.1
(3.16) (3.18) (3.19) (3.19)
Singapore 3.6 1.4 0.4 0.0
(4.19) (3.21) (2) (0.7) (1.58)
Slovakia 1.6 3.2 3.9 3.2 1.6
(2.6) (2.39) (2.14) (1.83) (1.41)
Swaziland 27.6 51.2 62.3 57.2 39.7 17.9
(9.38) (9.87) (10.2) (10.26) (9.8) (8.53)
t-ratios given in parentheses
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Table A-2
Canada: non-linear least squares estimates of ETEs for clothing
supplier 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Brazil 43.2 8.8 1.7 1.7
(2.89) (3.3) (3.42) (3.42)
China 43.7 13.7 2.9 0.3
(3.26) (3.65) (3.84) (3.89)
Dom. Rep. 4.8 1.0 0.1 1.0
(0.75) (0.76) (0.76) (0.76)
Jamaica 40.8 35.7 60.5 70 44.4 9.5 82.5
(2.5) (2.75) (2.55) (2.44) (2.53) (2.4) (2.56)
Lebanon 128.4 18.9 0.2 1.5 4.4 42.6
(2.6) (3.41) (0.89) (6.61) (2.86) (3)
Morocco 88.3 69 96.5 131.6 139.9 110.6 69.1 48.4
(2.77) (2.93) (2.73) (2.54) (2.51) (2.65) (2.9) (2.89)
Poland 13.6 15.8 10.9 6 4.5 6.4 8.5 4.3
(2.19) (2.28) (1.94) (1.34) (1.05) (1.29) (1.51) (0.96)
Korea, PR 82.6 33.3 44.9 324.6 1244.3 890.4
(2.75) (3.14) (3.19) (2.01) (1.39) (1.53)
Romania 2.9 9.4 17.6 22.1 13.8
(3.26) (3.14) (3.0) (2.88) (2.7)
Slovakia 2.0 0.2 5.7 16.2 27.7 28.7
(2.48) (0.61) (1.97) (2.12) (2.23) (2.66)
Swaziland 5903.4 129.5 8.4
(1.01) (2.57) (3.66)
Syria 207.6 47.9 9.0 0.9
(2.27) (3.12) (3.62) (3.77)
Turkey 22.1 7.3 1.6 0.2
(2.39) (2.57) (2.66) (2.68)
Uruguay 65.4 19.5 4.0 0.4
(3.22) (3.78) (4.06) (4.14)
Vietnam 60.6 19 19.4 29.0 31.3 20.5 5.1
(3.02) (3.47) (3.37) (3.21) (3.17) (3.29) (3.08)
t-ratios given in parentheses
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Table A-3
EU: non-linear least squares estimates of ETEs for textiles
supplier 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Argentina 7.5 0.6 3.2 4.3 2.8 0.1
(10.71) (4.69) (7.6) (7.91) (7.38) (0.96)
Belarus 4.9 4.1 4.5 8.9 16.0 19.4 7.8
(9.88) (7.48) (7.55) (9.42) (10.64) (11.86) (15.17)
Brazil 5.3 9.9 8.0 4.8 3.1 3.4 3.7 0.2
(6.98) (9.4) (9.18) (7.8) (6.38) (6.87) (7.65) (0.72)
China 22.8 21.1 16.4 13.0 12.5 14.4 16.3 13.4
(11.1) (11.7) (11.54) (11.05) (11.01) (11.49) (11.9) (11.36)
Hong Kong 7.0 9.1 6.4 3.0 0.8 0.4 0.9
(6.45) (7.8) (7.51) (5.39) (1.93) (1.07) (2.73)
Indonesia 2.2 3.0 3.4 3.1 2.2 1.0 0.03
(2.69) (4.28) (4.47) (4.11) (3.66) (3.03) (0.3)
India 7.1 8.0 5.5 2.9 1.6 1.7 2.1
(8.63) (9.01) (8.23) (6.18) (4.11) (4.51) (6.22)
South Korea 12.1 12.2 11.4 10.7 10.3 9.9 8.6 4.8
(8.41) (9.06) (9.03) (8.96) (9.19) (9.61) (9.59) (6.86)
Sri Lanka 5.9 3.1 2.7 2.8 2.4 1.2
(5.98) (5.52) (4.62) (4.3) (4.24) (4.27)
Malaysia 10.6 10.4 7.6 6.0 7.0 9.9 11.6 6.7
(7.63) (7.93) (7.31) (6.86) (7.64) (8.79) (9.18) (7.47)
Pakistan 15.1 14.3 10.0 6.0 3.9 3.5 3.3 0.01
(10.3) (10.2) (9.72) (8.49) (7.08) (6.98) (7.87) (0.3)
Peru 10.2 3.8 4.3 6.9 8.7 8.3 6.1 4.4
(10.21) (6.59) (7.38) (9.54) (10.42) (10.5) (9.87) (8.37)
Philippines 0.9 0.2 0.04 0.04
(1.16) (1.17) (1.17) (1.17)
Korea, PR 1.5 4.4 8.6 13.2 17.3 19.4 17.8
(1.72) (4.07) (7.03) (8.96) (9.66) (9.78) (9.88)
Singapore 13.6 15.1 12.7 9.1 6.1 4.8 5.2 6.9
(8.17) (8.65) (8.87) (8.75) (8.04) (7.14) (7.02) (7.63)
Thailand 6.0 4.7 2.6 1.8 2.7 4.6 5.1 0.3
(6.73) (5.91) (4.11) (3.18) (4.54) (6.41) (7.09) (0.87)
Uzbekistan 12.6 7.9 6.7 6.0 4.6 2.2
(12.18) (10.43) (9.54) (9.37) (9.47) (9.68)
Vietnam 21.1 22.2 18.7 13.9 10.0 7.8 7.5 8.3
(10.00) (11.13) (11.26) (10.78) (10.06) (9.66) (9.98) (10.13)
t-ratios given in parentheses
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Table A-4
EU: non-linear least squares estimates of ETEs for clothing
supplier 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Brazil 32.9 6.5 0.6 6.5
(2.91) (3.25) (3.35) (3.25)
China 94.2 67.8 41.9 25.1 18.2 19.3 24 24.1
(2.72) (2.95) (3.13) (3.17) (3.15) (3.27) (3.36) (3.25)
Hong Kong 5.6 1.8 0.3 0.1 0.1
(1.67) (1.44) (0.98) (0.94) (1.82)
Indonesia 10.1 3.2 0.5 0.3 0.8 1.2 2.0
(2.56) (1.75) (0.91) (2.1) (1.0) (0.84) (1.47)
India 23.9 13.5 6.7 2.7 0.7
(3.36) (3.2) (2.96) (2.7) (2.45)
South Korea 72.4 52.3 38.8 31.1 28 27.7 27.7 24.2
(2.85) (3.03) (3.12) (3.15) (3.17) (3.19) (3.19) (3.11)
Sri Lanka 35.6 18.2 5.6 0.2 1.7 8 14.1 10.3
(2.91) (3.01) (2.77) (0.36) (1.93) (2.92) (2.98) (2.88)
Peru 26.3 25.2 19.1 11.4 5.5 4.6 13.3 40.6
(3.12) (3.34) (3.3) (2.99) (2.28) (2.15) (3) (2.94)
Philippines 40.9 41.2 34.1 27.5 24.8 25.8 27.3 22.6
(3.03) (3.11) (3.13) (3.12) (3.15) (3.24) (3.32) (3.27)
Koera, PR 44.9 7.9 8.5 1 39.5
(2.55) (2.79) (2.57) (1.01) (2.89)
Singapore 17.6 1.9 0.6 3.4 5 3.3
(2.82) (1.97) (0.66) (1.99) (2.36) (2.52)
Thailand 48.5 37.2 26.1 19.2 16.8 17 15.6 6.0
(3.02) (3.15) (3.17) (3.12) (3.13) (3.24) (3.34) (2.66)
Usbekistan 9.6 80.5 5.7 0 17.1 37.8 37.8 3.7
(2.46) (2.76) (2.86) (3.64) (3.23) (3.12) (2.65)
Vietnam 72.8 54 41.7 34 29.7 27.7 27.1 26.7
(2.85) (3.02) (3.09) (3.11) (3.14) (3.21) (3.28) (3.22)
t-ratios given in parentheses
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Table A-5
USA: non-linear least squares estimates of ETEs for textiles
supplier 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bangladesh 0.3 0.8 2.3 3.7 3.5
(7.53) (7.52) (7.46) (7.41) (7.41)
Belarus 0.1 1.1 2.4 7.0 11.4 11.1
(0.74) (11.24) (14.09) (13.98) (13.82) (13.93)
Brazil 6.6 10.6 9.7 6.6 3.3 1.0 0.01 0.01
(13.56) (13.16) (12.91) (12.62) (11.99) (10.51) (0.49) (0.3)
China 6.9 4.3 4.6 5.7 6.3 6.6 7.8 12.5 25.3
(12.10) (10.39) (12.39) (14.55) (15.57) (16.26) (16.67) (15.51) (13.23)
Colombia 16.9 4.7 0.05 0.1 3.4 8.6 14.5 19.5 22.3
(5.51) (5.87) (0.36) (0.46) (3.67) (4.69) (5.31) (6.03) (6.89)
Czech Rep 1.0 2.6 4.7 7.2 10.7 15.9 24.0
(1.98) (2.26) (2.77) (3.8) (6.03) (10.36) (11.83)
Hungary 3.7 8.1 11.3 12.9 14.1 17.5 28.2
(6.2) (5.95) (5.85) (6.14) (7.45) (10.91) (12.4)
Indonesia 0.1 0.7 2.1 3.5 4.4 4.7 5.0 6.2 10.1
(0.58) (1.64) (3.57) (5.09) (6.45) (7.65) (8.25) (8.43) (7.37)
India 3.9 4.5 4.0 3.1 2.1 1.6 1.8 3.1 5.8
(9.95) (11.34) (11.08) (9.72) (7.51) (5.7) (6.16) (9.6) (11.57)
Jamaica 0.3 0.6 2.6 5.6 8.0 7.3
(1.68) (1.24) (1.98) (2.44) (2.76) (3.01)
Cambodia 111.5 22.6 1.2 4.5 7.0 4.7
(9.35) (12.24) (16.81) (12.39) (12.36) (12.55)
South Korea 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.3 0.9 4.5
(2.37) (2.22) (1.95) (1.37) (8.28) (4.69)
Lao PDR 0.4 3.6 10.6 20.9 31.5 36.6 27.8
(1.27) (9.94) (14.07) (12.94) (11.94) (11.44) (11.63)
Macedonia 102.4 30.2 6.5 1.3 1.3
(10.08) (12.34) (13.62) (13.96) (13.96)
Malaysia 0.03 0.02 0.2 0.8 2.5 5.8
(1.87) (0.7) (2.03) (3.43) (4.68) (5.68)
Pakistan 5.5 1.6 0.3 0.03 0.6 2.9
(8.55) (9.00) (9.65) (5.92) (7.54) (7.57)
Poland 0.03 6.2 9.1 10.3 11.1 12.5 15.1 19.3 24.9
(0.30) (4.66) (5.48) (6.5) (7.34) (7.7) (8.2) (10.08) (12.24)
Romania 4.9 2.3 0.3 1.9 5.8 10.6 14.3 13.5
(6.85) (4.66) (1.69) (11.59) (9.96) (9.89) (11.83) (19.6)
Slovakia 0.1 14.1 23.0 26.6 26.4 24.6 24.4 29.5 45.3
(0.62) (7.61) (8.62) (9.24) (9.23) (8.62) (8.22) (9.38) (11.54)
Thailand 0.03 0.03 0.1 0.6 1.6
(2.1) (2.1) (2.1) (2.1) (2.09)
Turkey 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.2 0.5
(1.06) (1.06) (1.06) (1.06) (1.06)
Ukraine 0.7 3.0 7.7 16.2 30.5 54.0
(6.63) (7.81) (9.12) (10.3) (10.72) (9.86)
Uruguay 2.2 4.3 5.2 5.5 7.5 15.2 36.8
(4.99) (4.58) (4.22) (4.28) (5.63) (8.09) (8.72)
Vietnam 78.9 101.3 95.7 73.5 47.1 24.3
(10.19) (9.89) (9.92) (10.25) (10.74) (11.22)
t-ratios given in parentheses
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Table A-6
USA: non-linear least squares estimates of ETEs for clothing
supplier 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bulgaria 0.4 0.3 0.0622 0.7 4.3 14.6 39
(1.52) (1.19) (0.52) (0.83) (2.13) (3.24) (3.49)
Brazil 3.5 0.1 0.6 0.6 3.0 13.2
(2.43) (0.6) (5.05) (4.67) (4.22) (3.97)
China 76.4 73.5 58.7 46.1 42.2 49.2 67.2 92.6 112.8
(2.99) (3) (3.13) (3.26) (3.3) (3.22) (3.04) (2.85) (2.74)
Colombia 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.9 3.7
(0.71) (0.71) (0.71) (0.71) (0.7)
Czech Rep 15.7 44.6 61.8 74.4 91.7 122.4 177 269.1 414.3
(2.18) (2.75) (2.8) (2.79) (2.73) (2.59) (2.38) (2.14) (1.87)
Hungary 0 0.4 8.8 21.5 35.6 49.1 61.7 76 99.7
(0.59) (2.78) (2.74) (2.69) (2.7) (2.78) (2.88) (2.83)
India 19.9 9.3 3.2 0.4 1.7 5.4 11.5 20.5
(3.72) (3.31) (2.74) (1.39) (2.78) (2.97) (3.29) (3.69)
Cambodia 60.6 19.2 4.3 0.8 0.8
(3.17) (3.67) (3.93) (4) (4)
Lao PDR 8.8 12.5 36.6 107.2 257.1 428.1 315.6
(2.6) (2.64) (2.87) (2.52) (2.05) (1.79) (1.95)
Poland 26.9 86.7 111.8 117.7 124.4 140.4 159.6 155.9 95.8
(2.69) (2.72) (2.58) (2.53) (2.47) (2.41) (2.37) (2.45) (2.81)
Korea, PR. 1537.2 1284.4
(1.33) (1.24)
Romania 3.7 4.1 13.2 28.7 49.3 73.9 101.6 133 171.4
(1.8) (1.86) (3.23) (3.2) (2.99) (2.81) (2.66) (2.55) (2.42)
Slovakia 5.9 21.6 50 90.10001 126.7 125
(3.03) (2.87) (2.65) (2.47) (2.45) (2.67)
Turkey 1.2 0.3 1.8 6.2 12.8 19.6 22.7
(1.02) (0.7) (1.7) (1.72) (1.89) (2.45) (3.95)
Uruguay 102.7 172.7 129.1 74.2 48.6 51.3 69.8 67.1
(2.73) (2.42) (2.61) (2.91) (3.03) (2.91) (2.77) (2.82)
Vietnam 471.2 432.7 555.9 630.3 496.5 250.4 74.5
(1.82) (1.85) (1.72) (1.65) (1.76) (2.13) (2.85)
t-ratios given in parentheses
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